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HOFSTRA LABOR LAW JOURNAL
Spring 1989

Volume 6, No. 2

ARTICLES

DEREGULATION-THE UNITED STATES
EXPERIENCE
Charles G. Moerdler*t
Deregulation became a reality largely as the result of an uncustomary consensus among economists that government controls upon
entry into, and exit from, particular markets were inefficient.1 From
*

Member of the New York Bar and Partner at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan.

t This article is an adaptation of a speech given at the Sixth Annual Edward F.
Carlough Labor Law Conference entitled, "Deregulation and Labor Law: The British'and
America Experiences." The conference was held at Queens' College, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, England in July 1988 and was sponsored by Hofstra University School of Law
and Queens' College. This speech is the last in a series of speeches that were adapted and
published in volume 6:1 of the HOFSTRA LAB. L.J..
1. Solomon, Lifting Controls, 17 NAT'L J. 2684 (1985) (citing M. DERTHICK & P.
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the late 1950's on, academics trumpeted the economic disadvantages
of Government's ever increasing scope of influence and regulation.'
They urged, instead, the wisdom of deregulation of certain industries
as a potential boon to those sectors of the economy, to the consumer
and, in the final analysis, the future well being of the nation.3 Consumer groups eventually joined the cause in the belief that competition would be fostered and, in turn, price benefits would result.4
Reform, however, would probably not have eventuated but for
the unlikely confluence of support from forces usually opposed to one
another. Then President Gerald Ford, bent on defeating inflationary
spirals and, at the same time, reversing the tide of big government,
joined the chorus of deregulation's proponents.5 Senator Edward
Kennedy, long a leader of liberal forces, concurred with the conservative President, scheduling Senate hearings on airline deregulation.' Then suprisingly, the regulatory agencies involved, rather than
opposing proposals which would lead to their eventual demise or, at
least, diminished influence, became enthusiastic proponents. 7 Soon,
deregulation became a talismanic phrase.
The airline, trucking and telephone industries-the latter with
an assist from the judiciary acting in antitrust litigation-were
among the earliest "beneficiaries" of reform.8 But the issue made for
strange bedfellows in opposition as well as in support. Most segments
of those industries-including the usually competing forces of management and labor-were opposed to deregulation.9
QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985)).
2. See M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 35 (1985) (citing
inefficient price and entry and exit regulations specifically).
3. See id. (noting that some academic economists have argued that "a substantial reduction in government regulation of transportation and heavy reliance on the forces of market
competition [would] insure services and rates in the best interest of the public." (quoting J.
MEYER, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES vi, 270

(1959))).
4. See id. at 42 (Ralph Nader, purporting to speak for consumers, formed Nader's
Raiders, a group of Ivy League graduate students "who were eager to expose the wrongdoing

of regulators, [and who] fanned out through government agencies and produced a series of
books on the incompetence and probusiness bias that they believed they had found there.").
5. See id. at 45-50 (Ford's criticism of regulation was, among other things, "popular
hostility to big government.").
6. Id. at 40; see also Solomon, supra note 1 (Kennedy scheduled the hearings at the
suggestion of an aide).
7. See supra note 2, at 51 (noting that "[i]n
the summer of 1975 a study done within
the CAB [Civil Aeronautics Board] staff called flatly for ending entry, exit, and price regulation within three to five years." (citing Regulatory Reform: Report of the CAB Special Staff
(CAB. 1975))).

8. See id. at 147-48.
9. See Solomon, supra note 1; see also Katz, The American Experience Under the Air-
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Management's opposition grew largely out of concern that cutthroat competition might endanger established markets and, in turn,

their bottom line. 10 Labor was opposed because it believed that regulation provided a certain framework for improvement, particularly in
the areas of wages and benefits, since increases could generally be

passed on to the consumer under existing mechanisms. 1 Both believed that deregulation jeopardized the measure of certainty which

governed their relationship, which was, for the most, a comparatively
tranquil one. 12 Both were right.
In the airline industry, for example, bankruptcies,' 3 mergers, 4
price wars,' 5 reductions in services and service areas,"6 and managerial upheavals have been visited upon management.' 7 Massive lay
offs, significant reductions in salaries, two-tiered salary structures,
unprecedented work rule changes, a plethora of labor disputes, and
even "union busting"' 8 have been labor's harvest. Indeed, so dramatic have been the consequences in the airline industry that unions
have now retaliated against management's unceasing efforts at cutting labor costs by assuming a role once reserved for Wall Street's
barons, that of "raiders," seeking to acquire a major publicly-held
airline conglomerate. 9 And, in the aftermath, a carefully assembled
line Deregulation Act of 1978-An Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 87 (1988)
(adapting the author's speech, presented at the Sixth Annual Edward F. Carlough Labor Conference on "Deregulation and Labor Law: The British and American Experiences," July 11,
1988).
10. Movat, Nation's Airlines Compete for a Piece of the Sky, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Feb. 8, 1985, at 22, col. 1 (stating that "[iln some cities numerous airlines have come and
gone in the competitive free-for-all during the last few years and industry experts forecast
significantly more airline closing and bankruptcies in the future.").
11. Hebert, Airline Turmoil, Associated Press, Mar. 27, 1988, Washington Dateline
(stating that "[labor] knew that [prior to deregulation] the government would pass the increased costs on [to the customer] in the form of higher fares.").
12. See id. (quoting Frank Cassels, a professor of industrial relations at Northwestern
University, who states that "prior to deregulation, there was a posture of accommodation,
[where] the unions accepted the companies and the companies accepted the unions. .. ").
13. See, e.g., Movat, supra note 10; see also Darrell, Airlines: Slow to Adapt: The Reality Deregulation: The New Era. 44 TRAVEL WEEKLY, 8 (1985).
14. See generally Labich, Winners in the Air Wars, FORTUNE, May 11, 1987, at 68.
15. See id.; see also Movat, supra note 10.
16. See Movat, supra note 10; see also Labich, supra note 14 (opining that "People
Express failed in part because many passengers would no longer suffer the indignities heaped
").
on them by People's no-frills approach- ..
17. See Herbert, supra note 11 (asserting that Pan American World Airways fired its
Chairman and several other senior executives after a closed door deal with the airline's labor
unions).
18. See, e.g., Hornung, Revolt at Allegis: How Labor and Wall Street Stopped Ferris.
CRAIN'S Cmi. Bus., Nov. 30, 1987, at 17.
19. See id.; see also Hebert, supra note 11; Labich, supra note 14 (stating that "[i]n
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conglomerate of airline, hotel car rental and other related businesses
sold off its non-airline properties.2"
Consumer organizations have become increasingly shrill, denouncing poor service, scheduling and pricing structures that are not
only inconvenient but also are so confusing that few professional
travel agents are able to decipher them.2 1 Indeed, on-time performance, particularly among those airlines which seem embroiled in interminable guerilla warfare with their unions, has become so bad
that airlines have now been required to issue on-time performance
records in the hope that disclosure of poor performance records will
shame the offenders into improvement for fear of losing business. 2
In turn, the pressures on Congress for some elements of regulation
have begun to build.23
Despite occasional prophecies of a rosy future, most agree that
the once regulated airline industry is largely worse off than under
regulation. 24 Already subject to cyclical economic pressures, the airlines now face the added burden of significantly increased debt due
largely to merger and takeover mania, in addition to the burdens
created by the uncertainties of frequent price wars, 25 and the increasingly hostile confrontations with labor as management attempts
to cut labor costs to become or remain profitable. 26 Labor is quick to
agree that deregulation has inflicted significant losses upon tens of
thousands of men and women-particularly the women.27 Layoffs,
reductions in wages and working conditions have become the order
of the day. 28 The once relatively tranquil labor-management relaApril [1987] the United [Air Lines] pilots announced a 4.5 billion bid for the airline.").
20. See Hornung, supra note 18.
21. See Labich, supra note 14; Movat, supra note 10.
22. See Henderson, American is Biggest Where it Counts Most: American Airlines Inc.
Part 2, 24 AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, 30 (1987) (noting that the airlines are required to also
make public other data such as "number of passengers denied boarding and the assistance
rendered to them, and percentage of bags mishandled.").

23. See Movat, supra, note 10 (stating that "if the problems [which have developed as a
result of deregulation, such as airport congestion and discriminatory airfares,] persist and in-

tensify, there may yet be another move in Congress to reimpose a few basic controls.").
24.
25.
26.

See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying-text.
See Movat, supra note 10.
See e.g., Hebert, supra note 11 (proposing that since deregulation, "along with the

bitter competition among airlines has come increasingly acrimonious relations with labor.");
see also Labich, supra note 15.
27. See Herbert, supra note 11 (stating that two-thirds of 6,500 flight attendants at

TWA, traditionally women, still await recall from a 1986 walk out, whereas the pilots and
mechanics, traditionally male, have fared better in standing up to management demands).
28. See Hebert, supra note 11; see also Labich, supra note 14.
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tionships, are now only a fond memory."'
The issue before us today is not whether deregulation is good or
bad. Rather, the focus here is upon the impact of deregulation from
the standpoint of labor-management relations, and, given the adverse
impact upon industry and jobs noted above, how labor and management can coexist and improve their collective lot in the face of severe
adversity. The thesis of this paper is that a way can and must be
found to have the parties in collision put aside the view that
"Rambo"-like tactics will achieve the desired result and explore, instead, the wisdom of dialogue, accommodation and reason. Such cooperation, it is submitted, cannot be the product of coercion or legislative or regulatory fiat, but must, instead, evolve from the crisis
itself and result from mutual recognition that, only through the suggested avenues, can either or both parties benefit, and the public interest be truly served.
An unlikely, but nonetheless instructive, analogy can be drawn
from the events that led to, and the dramatic resolution of, the fiscal
crisis that threatened to bankrupt America's preeminent city some
thirteen years ago. 30 Most students of the 1975 crisis that placed
New York City at the very edge of bankruptcy are agreed that its
salvation came about largely from the recognition of the City's governmental managers and of its labor leaders, as well as the City's
bankers and industrial and communal leaders, that their common
good mandated commonality.3 1 That only through joint action and
common pain would any of them survive. Thus, given that conclusion, labor and management then put aside, for the moment, their
traditional rivalries and set about to steer a course which brought
the City back from the brink. 2
Obviously, there will be those who will maintain that deregulation has not inflicted anywhere near the pain, or created anything
resembling the chaos or crisis that was at stake in the New York
City fiscal crisis, and, they are right.3 3 However, the lesson there
taught is apt, as I shall briefly attempt to demonstrate. First, how29. See Hebert, supra note 11.
30. The New York City fiscal crisis of 1975 was precipated in large part by its inability
to borrow in the municipal bond market. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
31. See Roberts, 75 Bankruptcy Scare Alters City Plans into 21st Century, N.Y.
Times, July 8, 1985, at Al, col. 5 (publishing part five of a five part series entitled Back From
the Brink. The Enduring Legacy of New York's Fiscal Crisis).
32. See id. (stating that "[tihe generally adversarial relationship among city and state
officials, labor leaders and businessmen evolved into a generally constructive partnership.").
33. Perhaps only the Chrysler near-bankruptcy provides fair comparison with the New

York City saga.
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ever, let us frame the issue by reference to the impact of deregulation upon the airline industry.
Beginning in the 1930's, and for more than four decades thereafter, airlines occupied a somewhat unique place in American industry. Like most other businesses and industries, they hired and fired,
bought and sold airplanes and offered services in seemingly much the
same manner as other businesses. They, however, had an advantage
which few businesses shared. Their activities were regulated under,
and they benefitted from, the protection offered by the Federal Aviation Act, 4 which accorded them privileges much akin to public
utilities.3 5
Under the Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter
"CAB"), a Federal agency, regulated where each airline could fly,38
determined the reasonableness of the airlines' proposed fare structures,3 7 policed the airlines' practices to insure that the authorized
fare schedules were in fact adhered to,38 shielded the industry from
most antitrust law proscriptions and otherwise insured stability in
the industry.3
Competition was a congressionally prescribed goal, but only to
the extent required to maintain a sound air transport system.40 Airlines were required to offer joint fares to facilitate interlining. 41 Industry costs were, pursuant to an elaborate formula, the measurement against which was produced a predetermined fair price for
carriage. 42 Things like supply and demand, a particular airline's
costs and management practices, and other criteria that measure
price formulations in other businesses were of little, if any, import. 43
Cooperative ventures abounded. 44 Under the Mutual Aid Pact, air34. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737, (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)) (originally enacted as the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, as amended by Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973).
35.
36.

See Katz, supra note 9, at 87-88.
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1982).

37. 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1982).
38.
39.
40.

49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1982).
49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1982).
See McDonald, Airlines Management Prerogative in the Deregulation Era, 52 J.

AIR L. & CoM. 869, 918 (1987) ("asserting that the CAB often would award new routes to
unprofitable, inefficient carriers in order to maintain a competitive balance in the industry,").
41.

49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1982).

42. See id.
43. See M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, supra note 2, at 19 (asserting the theory that "regulation crumbled because the original public interest rationale for it ceased to comport with
economic reality.").
44.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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lines even contributed to an airline suffering a strike.4 5 Though the

airlines' fortunes also depended in measure on cyclical conditions,
the CAB was generally at the ready to facilitate needed mergers"6 or

approve rate increases when shown to be necessary.

Such stability

had its advantages: bankruptcies, hostile takeovers, and price wars

were unknown.
Labor benefitted from this arrangement. Since the cost of individual labor contracts could be included in the industry's overall
costs-and thus passed on to the consumer as part of the fare schedules-the airlines were generally able to give fairly steady increases.4 Similarly, benefits and working conditions were subject to
fairly constant improvement. 9
In 1978 Congress rewrote the Federal Aviation Act, 50 directing
the CAB to place maximum reliance on competitive market forces.5
The campaign for deregulation started by economists and joined by
such diverse forces as Ford, Kennedy, consumer groups and the
agencies whose existence or vitality would thereby be doomed, had

become a reality. 2
Few believed, however, that the impact would be as tumultu-

ous, or as quickly manifested.5 3 By 1985, some 120 airlines, including commuter and charter firms, had either entered bankruptcy or
simply closed.54 Consumers were soon startled to find that many
smaller cities, which had once been served by jet transport several
times each day and by direct access to major cities, now found that
45. See Katz, supra note 9, at 92 (noting that "struck airline would receive a share of
the windfall profits earned by its competitors which gained revenue due to the strike.").
46. 49 U.S.C. 1378 (1982).
47. See Katz, supra note 9, at 92.
48. See id.; see also Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New
JudicialInterpretationof The Railway Labor Act, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1003 (authored by Beth
S. Adler) [hereinafter New Judicial Interpretation of the RLA](demonstrating that "[p]rior
to 1978, management routinely conceded to union demands particularly with respect to
salaries.").
49. Aviation Safety Management: Continental Airlines-A Case Study: HearingBefore a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 293 (1984).
50. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 90-504, 922 Stat. 1705 (codified in
scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Airline Deregulation Act of 1978].
51. See New JudicialInterpretationof the RLA, supra note 48 (stating that "[ajirlines
are now free to set their own fares-up to five percent above or down to fifty percent below the
standard industry fare level (SIFL)-without obtaining Civil Aernautics Board (CAB)
approval.").
52. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, supra note 50.
53. Since deregulation, major airlines have suffered bankruptcy, falling revenues and
overwhelming indebtedness. See Britton, Airline Deregulation in the United States, Focus,
Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 3.
54. The Christian Science Publishing Society, Feb. 8, 1985 (citing ATA statistics).
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turbo-prop aircraft were substituted and that feeder airline service,
often on less frequent and sometimes irregular schedules, had now
taken their place.55 Takeoffs and landings, which had been staggered
at major hubs, now were concentrated in the same hours, much to
the consternation of business travellers."
The impact on labor relations was even more dramatic.57 The
Chairman and Vice Chairman of Pan American Airlines and several
senior executives were fired after a closed door deal between directors and the airline's unions. 58 The Air Line Pilots Association [hereinafter "ALPA"], once viewed as the least militant labor organization 59-- it had frequently refused to honor picket lines of other
unions in the industry-launched a 29 day strike at United Air
Lines. 60 United's management had demanded a dual pay structure
under which new hires would be paid significantly less than current
employees.61 Management's effort prevailed, but on far less onerous
terms, from labor's standpoint, than had initially been demanded. 2
However, the mere fact that ALPA was prepared to mount and sustain for an extended period an expensive strike, and the fact that
management's efforts to break that strike had failed, of itself provided a foretaste of the new militancy of labor.
The second shoe dropped not long thereafter, when ALPA announced a multi-billion dollar tender for ownership control of
United. Though ALPA's sally into the waters once reserved for
55. See Movat, supra note 10 (noting that under CAB regulation, an airline received a
route because the CAB determined it was a "public convenience and necessity" 49 U.S.C.
1371(d)(1982)). All functions, powers and duties of the CAB were terminated or transferred
by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 90-504 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744.
56. Id.
57. See Hebert, supra note 11.
58. Id.
59. See Lublin, Conservative Pilots' Union Turns Militant in Response to Fight at Continental Airlines, Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1983, at 37, col. 4.

60. On May 15, 1985, the Air Line Pilots Association struck United Air Lines after
their collective bargaining agreement had expired. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
61. "United sought to renegotiate . . . compensation to be paid both incumbent employees and new hires. . . . As negotiations progressed, it became obvious that the key issue
was United's desire to have a reduced pay scale for those pilots hired during the duration of a
new agreement." Id. at 891.

62. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. United Airlines, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1020, 1037
(D.C. I11.1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987) (stating that "[o]n May 20, United agreed
to resume negotiations with ALPA. . . . within two to three days, the parties reached a tentative agreement on the new-hire pay scale issue.").

63. See MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: Rough Raider/Taking Control (PBS television
broadcast, Nov. 4, 1987) (transcript No. 3158); see also Hornung, supra note 18.
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"raiders" proved unsuccessful,6" the array of prominent investment
bankers, legal talent and skilled publicists which the union had
amassed demonstrated a new sophistication and resourcefulness on
the part of labor. More impressive, however, was the fact that the
stock in United which the union had acquired, as part of the overall
"wage" package-the so-called employee stock option plan or
ESOP-together with some $14 million in voluntary contributions
from the membership and sizeable bank loans provided by major
lenders, had enabled the union to leverage a $4.5 billion acquisition
offer. 5 And to cap this exploit, United's CEO was ousted, despite
the fact that under his leadership United had created a multi-billion
dollar conglomerate, amassing an impressive array of acquisitions,
including Hertz and the Hilton chain.6 6 His successor got the message and the long delayed labor contract negotiations with other unions were soon concluded.6 And in the aftermath, the conglomerate
that briefly was known as Allegis returned to essentially its former
shape with the sell-off of Hertz, Hilton and other properties. 8
However, labor has little to crow about. "Union busting" and
the spread of nonunion airlines have become an important industry
factor. Frank Lorenzo, through the vehicle of a small regional carrier, Texas Air Corp., has built in relatively short order the nation's
largest airline by merger with, or acquisition of, such onetime behemoths as Eastern, Continental, Peoples and Frontier.69 The unions
discovered early that in Lorenzo they had met a determined
adversary.
When negotiations with Continental's unions to secure significant givebacks proved unavailing, Continental was placed in bankruptcy and its labor contracts vitiated.7 0 Following a brief shutdown, 1 Continental emerged with pilots flying the same planes at a
fraction of their former salaries and benefits, and stripped of their
64. See Hornung, supra note 18.
65. See id.
66.

See id.; see also Hebert, supra note 12 (stating that with the addition of two hotel

chains and the rental car company, Richard Ferris, United's CEO, "envisioned one-stop shopping for transportation and lodging for businessmen.").
67. See Hebert, supra note 12 (stating that Frank Olson, Ferris' successor, hired D.C.
lawyer Stephen Tallent, who quickly reached contract agreement with the flight attendants

and machinists).
68.

See id. (noting that Mr. Olson quickly agreed, subject to shareholder approval, to

rename the company United Airlines Inc.).
69.
70.
71.

See Labich, supra note 14.
See id.; see also Hebert, supra note 11.
See Hebert, supra note 11.
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former seniority.72
At Eastern the labor wars have produced an hitherto unbelievable confrontation. Nonunion pilots from another carrier were readied to fly the Eastern planes in the event of an anticipated strike.78
Eastern's employees challenged its safety record and management's
attempts to sell or transfer assets, resulting in the commencement of
judicial and administrative proceedings.7 4 The war goes on and on,
with grievous wounds inflicted on all sides.
TWA's flight attendants launched a strike when faced with demands for sharp salary cuts, and were promptly replaced.75 Indeed,
the replacements had been given safety and other training in anticipation of the strike and were in the wings ready to act once the
strike commenced.7" A significant number of the approximately 6500
attendants who struck still are grounded.
In airline after airline pay cuts have eventuated, as have work
rule changes.7 8 The specter of "contracting out"-as demonstrated
by Eastern's suggestion that it could reduce ground operation costs
at Jacksonville from $150,000 a month to between $50,000 and
$70,000-has become a continuing threat, to the consternation of
union leaders who see jobs and membership endangered. Another development has been the widespread institution of dual pay structures
with new hires receiving significantly lower pay than those already
employed.79 The union leadership in consenting to this dual system
may to some extent have met their needs vis-a-vis current members,
but the new hires provide a growing body of members who, mindful
of their different status, can one day rise up against the union's leadership.80 And the claim is frequently advanced that airlines with a
dual structure have acted to dismiss senior employees in order to
72. See id.; see also Labich, supra note 14 (proposing that Lorenzo's reopening of Continental as a nonunion carrier "stunned the industry-and earned him the undying enmity of
airline labor leaders.").

73. See Hebert, supra note 11 (mentioning that "[a]n Eastern executive referred to the
non-union pilots [from Orion Air] as Eastern's insurance coverage.").
74. Clayton, Cooling the Fire at Eastern, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 8, 1988, at 11
(stating that Lorenzo's proposed sale of Eastern's most profitable asset, its shuttle service, was
blocked in court by the unions and employee charges of safety violations, which also prompted
a Federal Aviation Administration safety inspection).
75.

See Hebert, supra note 11.

76. See Katz, supra note 9, at 99 (noting that once the strike occurred 2,800 previously
trained, permanent replacements were hired).
77. See Hebert, supra note 11.

78. See supra notes 17, 63-67 and accompanying text.
79. See Labich, supra note 14; see also supra notes 17, 63 and accompanying text.
80. See Labich, supra note 14.
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replace them with lower paid new hires.
Morale among many employees continues to decline, and with it
travellers increasingly believe that service standards are at best,
poor. 8 ' Consider the impact upon the travelling public of the following story published in the April 11, 1988 issue of Fortune magazine:
The incident started on a Sunday afternoon when over 200 Eastern
passengers showed up at Miami airport for the 3:15 flight to New
York, only to discover it had been cancelled. No one behind the
counter seemed to know exactly what had gone wrong, and the
crowd grew increasingly angry as plane after plane took off without
them. Toward the end of a very long day, one passenger went behind the counter and punched an agent in the chest. The police
arrived and three of them hustled the fellow out as the crowd
shouted and jeered.82
The incident, as Fortune went on to detail, is by no means isolated:
".. . difficulties at Eastern's gates have been so frequent that Dade
County police assigned an officer to patrol the area full time during
the peak tourist season this winter. 83
"Once-proud Eastern," Fortune added, "has become perhaps
the most troubled carrier in an often troubled industry. '8 4 The statistics tell the tale: net losses of $181.7 million on revenues of $4.4
billion in 1987.85 According to Fortune, even greater deficits are anticipated in 1988. A recent Department of Transportation consumer
"report card" reflected, according to Fortune, that Eastern "finished
dead last in on time performance (only 61.5 percent of its flights
arrived within 15 minutes of schedule), 86 and had the highest rate of
passenger complaints
of any airline except Continental-Lorenzo's
'8 7
other large carrier."
The cause, Fortune opined, was "[e]xceedingly hostile management labor relations." 8 Some 500 pilots surrendered cherished seniority to start over with another airline in 1987, and another 250
had given notice by April of 1988 according to Fortune.89 Eastern
acknowledges that this, in turn, has caused the cancellation of nu81.
82.

See supra notes 60-62.
Labich, The Slowdown at Eastern Airlines, FORTUNE, Apr. 11, 1988, at 65.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

87. Id.

88. Id
89. Id.
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merous flights.90 And, according to Fortune, Eastern acknowledges
its "difficulties" in "motivating such employees as flight attendants
and ticket agents to deal with the public politely while ferocious labor battles take place inside the company."9 1
Not all airlines have undergone turmoil such as that illustrated
above. However, few major airlines have avoided some form of labor
management strife. With labor cost comprising a significant portion
of their costs, 92 and unable to pass those charges along to the consumer,93 particularly in the face of mounting price competition,
management's focus has been, and gives every indication of continuing to be on affecting reductions. While such efforts are not at all
unusual, what has marked this effort in the airline industry has been,
the increasing hostility on both sides. Implementation has replaced
negotiation; 94 confrontation has replaced reasoned give and take.95
And the residuum of ill will is deep and certain to be lasting.
To make matters even worse, the focus of media attention, often
precipitated by the combatants, has revealed all to the traveling public. Long established loyalties have undergone significant change as
travellers, particularly business travelers, have come to believe that
certain airlines are unreliable, offer less service and the like.96 That,
in turn, has helped engender expensive campaigns-from advertising
to frequent flight bonuses-to acquire or rebuild customer loyalty.
And, of course, the costs attendant to those efforts can not help but
affect, to one degree or another, the "bottom line."
Not all airlines have undergone turmoil in labor-management
relations to the degree or with the intensity noted above. However,
it is clear that the airline industry, following deregulation, is by no
means the stable, relatively profitable and tranquil enterprise it once
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Labich, supra note 14 (stating that labor costs, as an industry average, run 38
percent of total operating costs); see also Hebert, supra note 11 (noting that over 35 percent
of an airlines operational costs are for labor, according to the Air Transportation Association).
93. See Labich, supra note 14 (professing price competition from nonunion operations
with far lower labor costs, such as People Express and Frank Lorenzo's Continental, prevent
firms from passing on their higher labor costs to the consumer).
94. See id. (stating that Frank Lorenzo stopped negotiating with the unions and shut
down Continental Airlines, he then declared bankruptcy, shed the existing labor contracts, and
three days later, Continental emerged with pilots flying the same planes, but earning half the
salary).
95. Id.; see also Hebert, supra note 11 (proposing that "[a] state of outright hostility
[has existed] between labor and management in recent years.").
96. See Labich, supra note 82.
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was. 7 Ever increasing debt-incurred to fuel takeover fever, to finance new aircraft needed to meet changing patterns, and, in some
instances, to meet higher than usual interest payments exacted by
wary lenders-seems certain to provide the seed for future difficulties. Stock gyrations and takeover fever have marked a number of
airlines as present or future takeover targets. 9 From the standpoint
of labor management relations, things probably could be worse, but
not much.
Still another "beneficiary" of deregulation-albeit partial deregulation-has been the trucking industry. The statistics are telling.
From a high of about 500 large general freight carriers in 1978, only
about 150 remain today. 9 Between 1980 and 1987, the top ten general freight carriers' share of total revenues went from less than 40
percent to nearly 60 percent. 00 Driver shortages have increased, in
part because driver wages (averaging about $25,000 per year in the
non-union truckload sector), have risen only about half as much, on
the average, as wages in other industries.' True, some segments of
the industry have benefitted-particularly full-truckload carriers-as
well as shippers, 10 2 but this benefit could hardly be worth the expense.
Labor likewise has been affected. One report indicates that
some 78 Teamster-organized carriers have either declared bankruptcy, been swallowed up in mergers or simply have gone out of
business. 103 Between 1979 and 1985 the Teamsters Union lost some
120,000 members to non-union shops, some of them subsidiaries of
unionized carriers party to the industry-wide Master Freight Agreement.0 4 There is every indication that that trend continues.
Yet one important distinction stands out in any comparison between deregulation of the airline and trucking industries. The labor97. See Labich, supra note 14 (stating that since the close regulation of fares, routes
and schedules, the "airline bosses grazed sleepily on a peaceful playing field" and after de-

regulation, the industry is describably the closest thing to legalized warfare).
98.

Id. (stating that both United and Pan American Airlines have been recent takeover

targets).
99.

100.
101.

Ettore, Trucking: The Squeeze Gets Tighter, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 4, 1988.

Id.
Id.

102. Trucking Deregulation Promotes Competition, Lower Prices, ICC Says, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-4 (Sept. 24, 1984) (stating that the chairman of the ICC told
the senate that deregulation of the trucking industry has "enhanced competition among truck-

ers, increased revenue for motor carriers, and resulted in lower prices.").
103.

Trucking Lines Reach Contract with Unions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1988, at As, col.

104.

Id.

4.
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management hostility which abounds in the airline industry is not
evident in the trucking industry. 105 Significantly, perhaps, the trucking industry is dominated by a single, politically powerful union. 10 6
Leadership of the Teamsters Union is able in most instances to speak
for the membership and to deliver upon its undertakings in the negotiating process. 10 7 Thus, by means of a Master Agreement, labor and
management have been able to conclude most of their bargaining for
the entire unionized-sector of the industry for a three year period.108
By contrast, the airlines must deal with a number of unions, and
indeed, in many instances, on an airline by airline, chapter by chapter basis. Though important, that distinction would not appear to
explain fully the contrast between the labor-management climate in
these two vital transportation-related industries.
Declining profits, increased competition, discounting, bankruptcies and consolidation has afflicted management in both industries
following deregulation. Work force reductions, 10 declining benefits,110 increased nonunion employers 11 and other like concerns has
preyed on labor's mind in both industries following deregulation.
However, it seems clear that, since deregulation, labor-management
relations in the airline industry has been marked by a degree of hostile confrontation that is unique. And therein may lie a lesson. Unduly hostile labor-management relations, particularly where they
continue over an extended period of time, can not help but exacerbate problems. And where they impact adversely upon the consumer,
the cost can be telling as well as lasting.
Against that background, imagine, if you will, this scenario. A
vital service industry is, virtually overnight, confronted with imminent bankruptcy. The financial markets are closed to it. The forthcoming payroll for hundreds of thousands of workers is in doubt. A
debt moratorium is legislatively imposed, with the credibility of bil105.

Id. (reporting that after two months of negotiations there was "little evidence of

rancor [and] either side mentioned the possibility of a strike.").
106. See supra note 102 (stating that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, with

collective membership of 1.8 million, is the dominant union).
107.
108.

Id.
Dissident Teamsters Sue Over Contract Ratification, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.

104, at 1 (May 31, 1988) (stating that the teamsters and the trucking industry reached an
agreement which will run from 1988-1991).
109. Master Contracts in Deregulated Industries will Shrink But Won't Disappear,
Dunlop Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at A-4 (Jan. 28, 1985).
110. See id. (noting that wage and benefit levels are 20 to 25% below their pre-deregulation level).
111. See Kaynard, Deregulationand Labour Law in the United States, 6 HOESTRA LAB.
L.J. 1, 19 (1988).
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lions of dollars of outstanding financial paper necessarily clouded. So
important is the survival of that domestic entity that the then Chancellor of West Germany and the then President of France, in as diplomatic terms as possible, issue calls for rescue.112 Yet, the President
of the United States turns a deaf ear."13
Rescue, however, comes from a surprising source. Labor unions
undertake to loan billions from their pension funds to finance a
bailout." 4 Giants of industry and commerce, including Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller and Citibank's Walter Wriston, commence an ongoing dialogue with labor leaders to find and promote
solutions to a common problem. Real estate enterprises undertake to
pre-pay their taxes to help meet cash fiow." 6 And although tens of
thousands of workers and management personnel are laid off, the
furor is muffled. Disparate labor unions put aside their rivalries and
undertake coalition bargaining with management to minimize oneupmanship and to facilitate the bargaining process. L6 Increased productivity becomes a benchmark for wage increases. Labor leaders
agree that for a period of years labor contracts will be subject to
third party review. Dialogue replaces confrontation, and solutions
are the end product. Within a short span of years, relative fiscal
health is restored," 7 in fact, significant surpluses replace overwhelming fiscal disaster. Laid off employees are gradually rehired and access to money markets is regained.""
The picture thus painted may to some seem fictitious. Yet all
that and more occurred during and in the wake of the 1975 fiscal
crisis which threatened to bankrupt the City of New York and raised
112. See Binder, Bonn Leader, in New York Asks Closer Cooperationin Economic Policy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
113. See Madden, President is Commended and Assailed on Stand, N.Y. Times, Oct.
30, 1975, at 47, col. 1 (quoting President Ford's announcement that he opposed any bill to
"bail out" New York City).
114. See Weisman, Levitt to Invest his Pension Funds to Tide Over City, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (mentioning that Arthur Levitt agreed to use a 250 million from two
state employee pension systems to help tide the City over its cash shortages).
115. See Clines, Emergency Board Confirms Estimate of City Revenue, N.Y. Times,
Sept 24, 1975, at 54 (stating that "the [emergency] board noted [that] 976.7 million [dollars]
had already been received by the city through pre-paid real estate taxes and advances in'state
aid").
116. See, e.g., Teamsters, Trucking Industry Beat Deadline on Contract, Associated
Press, Apr. 1, 1988, Washington Dateline.
117. See Fowler, Many Laid Off Found Back on New York City Payroll, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1976, at 25, col. 1 ("reporting that three quarters of the blue dollar and clerical civil
service workers laid off in New York City's fiscal crisis found their way back into the municipal payroll by [January 1976].").
118. Id.
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the prospect that the State of New York and who knows what other
entities and creditors would then be pulled over the abyss. Labor,
management, and commerce as a whole proved that they can work
together if the hand of good will was extended on all sides and the
pain was shared. Dialogue and will were the key.
The decade of the 1960's was a period of significant growth for
New York City."' 9 The City's population grew steadily, peaking in
1966 at slightly over 8 million. 120 And with that growth, employment
expanded, and that growth continued even after the population began to decline in 1966.121 Between 1963 and 1969, the period of the
decade's most sustained employment growth, the number of jobs
grew by almost 265,000.122 By 1969, New York City had close to 3.8
1 24
million jobs.123 Other economic indicators were equally optimistic.
However, these same positive statistics masked a number of significant economic trends portending serious problems. While total payroll employment steadily increased, declines in industries that had
traditionally provided entry-level jobs to unskilled workers began a
marked decline. 125 They included rhanufacturing, wholesale and retail trades, transportation, and public utilities. 2
Nationally, the 1960's were characterized by substantial population growth in urban areas and a concomitant increase in government services.1 27 The great Society programs initiated during Lyndon Johnson's presidency fueled the steady expansion of local
government services' 28 and, in turn, increased the level of expectations for still further service. But new programs mandated by the
federal and state governments had to be supported by City reve119.

Bigel, New York City's FiscalSituation: Recurring Crisis or Long Term Stability,

City Almanac, Aug. 1983, at 2.
120. Id.; see also BUREAU OF CENSUS. US. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY
DATA BOOK; A STATISTICAL ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT (1967) (noting that New York City population in 1966 equaled 8,125,066).
121. See Bigel, supra note 119. New York City population dropped from a high of
8,125,066 in 1966 to 7,898,451 in 1968-1970. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT PHC(1)-145, Part 1, 1970, census of population and housing
(1972). While population dropped, employment grew from 3,307,548 in 1960 to approximately
3,750,000 in 1969. Bennett, Lindsay PredictsHealthy Economy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1969, at
1, col. 2.
122.
123.

Bigel, supra note 119.
Id.; see also Bennet, supra note 121.

124. Bigel, supra note 119, at 3; see also Bennett, supra note 121.
125. See Bigel, supra note 119, at 2; see also Stetson, Gains Shown Here By Service
Industry, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at 1, col. 3.

126. See Bigel, supra note 119, at 2; see also Stetson, supra note 125.
127.
128.

Bigel, supra note 119, at 3.
Id.
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nues. 12 9 For example, Medicaid, the largest of these programs, accounted for 29.5 percent of the City's share of public assistance
when the program commenced in 1966.130 By 1975, when the fiscal
crisis erupted, Medicaid accounted for 59.4 percent.' 3 '
When the national recession began in 1970, it triggered a seven
year decline in the City's economy.13 2 Unlike the nation as a whole,
the City did not recover in relatively short order from the 1970 recession. 33 Between 1969 and 1977, New York City lost over
600,000 jobs, or 16.1 percent of all jobs in the city in 1969. TM As
unemployment rose, and the exodus of entry level jobs continued, the
demand for ever increasing governmental services did not abate.
However, severe local budgetary pressures steadily increased. 3 5 The
City's expense budget had increased 260 percent between 1969 and
1975.136 To meet these competing and conflicting pressures-the demand for increasing services and the decline in the economic
base-the City began to finance operating expenditures not out of its
expense budget (which was financed by current tax revenues and
short term revenue measures), but out of its capital budget (which is
financed by long term debt vehicles). 37 At the same time, the City
sharply increased its short term financing measures. 138 Having committed itself to financing services through short term borrowing, and
with increased dependance upon long term borrowing to fulfill its
now-inflated capital budget needs, the City's dependance on the public securities market assumed significant proportions. By 1975, New
York City required over $8 billion in short-term financing in addition to funding over $800 million in operating expenditures out of
the capital budget. 39 The result of these and other factors, including
unreliable financial information, mounting deficits, and increasing
uneasiness among the banks, resulted in the closing of the public
securities markets to city debt. 40 The stage for fiscal disaster was
set.
Two major obstacles were presented in any effort by the city to
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (due largely to the economic downturn and increased governmental services).

136.

Id.

137.
138.

Id.
Id.

139. Id. at 4
140. Id.
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surmount its difficulties. The City had to: (1) eliminate the existing
budgetary imbalance between revenues and expenses, and (2) avoid
bankruptcy and obtain financing until it could reenter the public securities markets.1 41 Few believed that the City could surmount these
obstacles, yet the "miracle" was achieved.
Most informed observers agree-as did the governmental officials and the bankers-that the city's labor unions deserve much of
the credit. 42 They made available their pension funds as substitutes
for public security market financing. 43 They facilitated the painful
experience of massive layoffs. 4 They furnished give up upon give up
in benefits and work rule changes. 14 5 They submitted to fundamental
changes in the collective bargaining process, including pay freezes,
and agreed that increases would be tied to productivity gains. 4 6 Indeed, they lobbied for the legislative enactment of demands by the
banks that, as a condition of their agreement to roll over short term
City paper, labor contracts, as well as the City's budget, would not
become effective until first scrutinized and approved by a third-party
panel (the Emergency Financial Control Board) comprised of state
and municipal officials and public members drawn largely from the
business community. 47 Consider, if you will, when in your experience management and labor have agreed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, to surrender their prerogative of concluding their own bargained agreements, let alone submitting them to third parties for
scrutiny and approval. Further, putting aside parochial interests and
interunion rivalries, the unions bargained successive labor agreements on a coalition basis, thereby minimizing one-upmanship and
providing uniformity and certainty.
To provide savings, each union advanced proposals tailored to
its particular needs and constituencies. Some accepted reductions in
welfare contributions; others accepted the cessation of contributions
to their annuity plans. 4 8 Work rule changes were advanced by
141.

Id.

142.

Id.; see also Weisman, supra note 114.

143.
144.

Id.
See Clines, Beame Cites Rise in Attrition Rate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1976, at 29,

col. 3.
145.
146.

See Bigel, supra note 119, at 4.
See Gottlieb, New York's Rescue: The Offstage Dramas, N.Y. Times, July 2,

1985, at A4, col. 3 (providing part two of a five part series entitled Back From the Brink: The
Enduring Legacy of New York's Fiscal Crisis).
147. See Bigel, supra note 119, at 4.

148. See C. BRECHER & R. HORTON, SETrING MUNICIPAL PRIORITIEs; AMERICAN CITIES AND THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE, 306-07 (1984).
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others. 149 And all this happened on top of massive layoffs, pay
freezes and the like.1 50 To illustrate the enormity of the pain inflicted
on the work force, consider the following statistics. The municipal
work force on June 30, 1975 numbered 253,677."'1 By June 30, 1981
it had been reduced to 196,151-a reduction of 57,526 employees, or
22.7 percent. In fiscal year 1976 alone, the work force was reduced
by 41,490, accounting for 72 percent of all personnel reductions in
52
the six-year period.'
Givebacks of benefits were substantial for those workers who remained. They included changes in work rules (e.g., loss of reduced
summer hours for clerical workers, loss of a preparation period for
teachers, shorter lunch periods for transit workers, etc.), a reduction
in pension benefits, and, most significantly, increased pension contributions by employees. 5 These givebacks alone saved the City some
$130 million a year. 54

The pension funds of the several unions were also deployed to
permit recovery, specifically to finance the City's debt in the absence
of access to financial markets. 55 $4.75 billion of retirement fund
moneys were expended in the purchase of long-term debt, some onethird of it in unguaranteed Municipal Assistance Corporation paper. 158 Additionally, the retirement systems were called upon to provide millions for the purchase of short-term debt. 57
Importantly, all of these painful and tradition-breaking steps by
the leadership of all of the City's unions were undertaken without
undue rancor or hostility. The lasting bitterness, the corrosive macho
tactics, and resultant generation of public ill-will which has marked
labor-management relations discussed above, was not present. 15 8
One reason for the difference was that early in the process all
sides recognized that dialogue and accommodation were the sine qua
non for success and, hence, survival.
Let's examine one example of the accommodations that were
born of dialogue and reason. The Uniformed Sanitationmen's Asso149. See Bigel, supra note 119, at 6.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (noting that in spite of the city's fiscal solvency, municipal employees have not
regained this benefit).
155. See Weisman, supra note 114.
156. See Bigel, supra note 119, at 8.
157. Id. (noting that $4.75 billion was contributed).
158. See Roberts, supra note 31.
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ciation represents the thousands of workers charged with removing
the endless tons of accumulated refuse from the City's homes and
streets, cleaning those streets not only of refuse but of tons of snow
and ice in the winter and even of abandoned cars, and manning the
landfills and waste disposal facilities. 159 Their task is staggering and,
as New York City discovered in the (prefiscal crisis) 1968 strike,
their absence, more than any other service, will bring the City to a
halt. Their burden is truly unbelievable-try lifting 10 tons of garbage on your back day ifi and day out. The union membership is
fiercely loyal to respected leaders.160 The union's political power is
and for decades has been significant-John Lindsay would not have
been re-elected as Mayor of New York but for unions, he having
already lost his party's designation for re-election. Mayors, governors
and even presidents have acknowledged the Union's importance and
invaluable aid in elections.
Following the fiscal crisis, as the City began the long hard trek
toward solvency, the incessant theme was reduction in costs, coupled
with demands that increases in wages and benefits-in anything that
could add to cost-had to be based on a showing of increased productivity. Sanitation, like all other municipal unions, had given
much long past the point of great pain. Yet, its members demanded
wage increases because of spiraling inflation and years of increases
that failed to keep up with the pace of inflation. 161 Still the City
reiterated its demands-productivity, cost cutting, etc. The stage for
confrontation was set. Instead of confrontation, however, ingenuity,
innovation and reason prevailed.
Sanitation collection vehicles in New York City are massive.
They hold 20 or 25 cubic yards of refuse.162 Three men have traditionally been deployed to operate each truck and to pick up the heavily laden cans of refuse which are lined up in front of high-rise
apartment houses or, frequently, down a few steps and in front of
low rise apartment houses or brownstones. 63 Following mediation,
the Union and the City agreed that this traditional manning would
be changed. Two men would now be required to do precisely the
same routes and pick up the same quantity of refuse that once had
159.

Prial, The Basic Problem is 14,000 Tons of Waste Each Day. N.Y. Times, Dec.

11, 1976, at 37, col. 2.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
See C. BRECHER & R. HORTON, supra note 148, at 306-07.
See Prial, supra note 159.
See C. BRECHER & R. HORTON, supra note 148, at 306-07.
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been picked up by three.""

65
The savings to the City were measurable and substantial.
Through a process of attrition, manpower in the collection force
could be significantly reduced, impacting not only upon salary and
benefit costs, but also upon significant future pension expenditures.1 16 Given these sizable savings by way of increased productivity, the City was prepared to provide a meaningful pay differential to
those who would now bear an added burden. 67 Gain sharing and
productivity savings were realized. 68 There was no confrontation
and certainly none of the corrosive hostility that has marked the airlines' efforts to achieve cost reductions through labor savings. Accommodation, dialogue and creativity had achieved a mutually acceptable result.
This approach extended beyond the already complex problem of
labor-relations. Through a discreet and off-the-record association
called MUFFLE, leaders of commerce, labor, government and civic
organizations met to discuss how best to revitalize the City, to fashion plans for the future and to discuss and attempt to resolve day-today problems. 6 9 The diverse assemblage included: Walter Wriston,
Chairman of Citibank; Jack Bigel, consultant to the Unions, as cochairman; David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, among other members of the Bank; Felix Rohatyn, a partner
of the investment banking firm of Lazard Freres and Chairman of
MAC, (the Municipal Assistance Corporation); Victor Gotbaum,
Executive Director of District Council 37 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; and a variety of
leading public officials. 17 Again, dialogue and accommodation
achieved lasting results.
It merits emphasis that the lessons learned have been translated
in more recent years to the private sector. One example will be of
particular interest to those in the United Kingdom. In 1988 the New
York Post, then owned by Ruppert Murdoch, was put up for sale.' 7 '
The press reported it was then losing money at the rate of $17 to $20

164. Id.
165.

Id.

166. Id.
167.

Id.

168.

Id.

169.

See Smothers, New Tie Binds City Unionists, Bank Leaders, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,

1980, at 31, col. 1.
170.
171.

Id.
See Perry, America's Oldest Paper Sold to New York Real Estate Magnate, The

Reuter Library Report, Mar. 7, 1988 (p.m. cycle).
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million dollars a year. 172 Labor force reductions had been effected in
1987.173 The purchaser insisted on further savings-to be exact, $24
million in labor savings over a three year period. The savings were
effected. The route employed was not akin to what had occurred at
Wapping, England. The tactics employed were not the same as those
employed at Continental or at Eastern Airlines. The result of joint
labor-management discussions was that the unions were asked to
meet a proportional budget and, in many instances, employees were
offered buyouts at meaningful sums. Of course, there still was pain
for those terminated. However, recognizing that a crisis was at
hand-the outcome of which could well have been a shutdown of the
paper-labor and management were able to achieve a solution
through dialogue.
Valid parallels, it is submitted, can be drawn from the above
illustrations. Like deregulation, the City's crisis produced a sudden
change in the rules. Labor costs had to be reduced to effect necessary savings. There were no guideposts, no precedents existed for
survival in a new and strange economic climate. An entirely new
modus vivendi had to be constructed. Labor-management relations
in this context were fashioned on the basis of negotiation, not confrontation and the flexing of muscle, with punch for punch retaliation. And this formula was pursued not just for the moment, but for
the ensuing years-the climate and the ground rules had been established. Negotiation and accommodation are, after all, not creatures
of the moment; they are, or should be, ongoing. 4 Innovation can
and should be an important tool to achieve mutual objectives. Gain
sharing based on productivity is but one example.
The American experience with deregulation has been one of
dramatic change, of turmoil and of considerable pain for labor and
industry. If it has taught anything in the field of labor-management
relations, it is that there is a wrong way to conduct that process, and
the price then paid by both labor and management is substantial,
and may well be lasting.

172.
173.

Id.
Id.

174. It merits noting, for example, that in the broadcasting industry the IBEW meets
quarterly with management of certain major broadcasters to negotiate outstanding issues of
mutual concern.
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